Abstract Batina et al. have proposed a privacy-preserving grouping-proof RFID protocol 
Introduction
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is a wireless Automatic Identification and Data Capture (AIDC) technology for identifying a product, animal or person by using radio signals [1] [2] [3] . Due to the wide-spread usage of RFID tags and additionally, the tag limitations in terms of the circuitry (computation power), storage and power consumption, it is a great challenge to design an efficient and secure RFID authentication protocol. A well designed RFID protocol should resist the known privacy and security threats such as tag information leakage, tag location tracking, replay attacks, denial-ofservice attacks and server impersonation [4] .
For RFID protocols, the following security properties are the most important parts that we should consider during the processes of protocol design and analysis [5] .
Mutual Authentication: the tag and the server should be authenticated with each other. The tag-toserver authentication allows the server to verify that an incoming tag is authentic. The server-to-tag authentication allows the tag to verify that it is communicating with an authorized server [6] .
Untraceability: it captures the intuitive notion that a tag is untraceable if an adversary cannot distinguish whether he has seen the same tag twice [7] .
Desynchronization Resistance: we say that a protocol P is desynchronization resistant, if a tag never loses all its owners with respect to P [8] . It ensures that the protocol runs will never evolve into a state that where there is nobody who can successfully execute the protocol with a tag. In a desynchronization attack, the intruder aims to disrupt the key or the identification update, leaving tag and server's database in a desynchronized state and rendering future authentication impossible [6] .
Several theoretical models have been proposed to describe the privacy of RFID systems in the literature [9] [10] [11] [12] . In the theoretical framework of [10] , there are two characteristics of attackers: wide (or narrow) attacker and strong (or weak) attacker. The wide attacker has the ability of accessing to the result of the verification (accept or reject) in a server. If an attacker is able to extract a tag's secret and reuse it, he is a strong attacker. Otherwise he is a weak attacker. The protocol is defined as wide-strong privacy-preserving if a protocol is untraceable against a wide-strong attacker who is the most powerful.
Most of RFID authentication protocols are focused on symmetric-key solution or hash functions lies in the common perception that public-key algorithms are time consuming to calculate and they are too complicated for such low-cost environments. However in [13] , the authors have shown that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is also suitable to be used in the designing of RFID systems. They design an ECC-based processor which is able to use on RFID tags. Then some ECC based processors are proposed [14, 15] . In [16] , the authors design the EC-RAC authentication protocol based on the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). They claim that EC-RAC is proved secure under the generic group model and has the ability to minimize its computational workload. While in [5, 17] , it is shown that EC-RAC is vulnerable to tracking attack and replay attack. The authors in [17] present that the tags can be tracked if one has eavesdropped the same tag twice and a tag can be impersonated by an adversary if it has been passively eavesdropped three times. Then a revision of EC-RAC has been proposed in [18] . However, Deursen and Radomirović [19] prove that the revision of EC-RAC in [18] is still vulnerable to tracking attack for the case that the adversary has the ability of challenging the Server utilizing the linearity of EC group operation.
In [20] , the authors have proposed a privacy-preserving ECC-based grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention. A pair of RFID tags (as A and B ) are able to prove that they are scanned simultaneously through this protocol. However, in this paper we show that this proposed protocol has vulnerability that it can not resist of the tracking attack under the attack of wide-strong attackers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce system model and threat model. The protocol proposed in [20] has been reviewed in Section 3. We show the security analysis in Section 4 and propose the enhancement in Section 5. Finally, we draw our conclusions in Section 6.
System Background

System Model
A typical RFID system architecture [21] consists of three key components: RFID tags, RFID readers and a back-end server which is shown in Fig. 1 . The reader sends a radio signal to the tag and listens to the tag's response. The tag detects this signal and replies with its identification. The reader and the tag communicate with each other through the wireless network. While the communication channel between reader and database can either be wired or wireless. Usually, we assume that the communication between server and reader is secure due to the usage of advanced encryption scheme. The wireless communication channel between reader and tag is not secure and the adversary is able to eavesdrop on it. The adversary is also able to intercept or even modify and inject the communication messages. For the grouping-proof protocol proposed in [20] , we only care about the participate agents as Reader and Tags. 
Threat Model
RFID technology has been widely used in numerous applications, ranging from manufacturing, logistics, transportation, warehouse inventory control, and supermarket checkout counters, to many emerging applications [22] . RFID system may face with many threats which are launched by all kinds of attackers. These attackers may be active or passive. The construction of formal RFID security and privacy frameworks is fundamental to the design and analysis of robust RFID systems.
Dolev-Yao intruder model [23] is the classical model used to analyze security protocols. Under this model, the attacker may full control over the network. The adversary is able to eavesdrop on all messages exchanged between reader and tag, modify or block any message sent from reader to tag or vice versa, and may inject his own modified messages making them look like they are sent from tag or reader. Additionally, there is an assumption that the adversary can observe whether an agent complete its run successfully [5] when we analyze RFID protocols. The representative adversary models for RFID protocol analysis can be found in [10, [24] [25] [26] .
Review of the Protocol
In this section, we review the protocol proposed in [20] . The following notations are used in the rest of this paper. P is the base point on a Elliptic Curve (EC), and y and ) ( yP Y  are the trusted verifier's private-key and public-key pair, where yP denotes the point derived by the point multiplication operation on the EC group. The notation ) (T x is represented as the x -coordinate of the point T on the elliptic curve. t s and ) ( P s S t t  are the tag t 's private-key and public-key respectively. The two-party CTP protocol is shown in Fig. 2 . The tags and the reader will abort when a timeout occurs, or when they receive the EC point at infinity during the protocol execution. The details of protocol steps are as follows. . Then R verifies the following equations,
and
If the public keys of A and B as a S and b S are registered in the database of the verifier, the grouping proof is accepted and a timestamp is added.
Vulnerability of the Two-party Grouping-proof Protocol
In this section, we perform the vulnerability analysis of the protocol proposed in [20] under the attack of wide-strong attacker. We describe a tracking attack to against the two-party grouping-proof protocol with colluding tag prevention. To make this attack successfully, there are three phases for the construction which is shown in Fig. 3 .
(a) Phase I A normal session takes place. The attacker is able to eavesdrop on the message 
(5) The attacker blocks this message which is send form Tag B to the Reader. Then the adversary concludes the forged messages as
and 
verify the grouping proof constructed by A and B , Reader first checks that the proof has no been used before and then verifies the following equations,
For a wide attacker, there is one-bit extra information compared to a narrow attacker: the decision of the verifier whether to accept a tag or not [27, 28] . This extra bit information can be used by a widestrong attacker to perform a tracking attack. For the case that P s a and P s b can be verified correctly, Reader will accept this tag. So the wide attacker is able to get this information which induces to the leakage of Tag location.
Our Revised Protocol
The Revision
In this section, we propose the countermeasures to resist tracking attack for this grouping-proof protocol. We revise the protocol as shown in Fig. 4 . The messages 
